Strategy in Iraq: A Problem of Social Engineering

Expeditionary operations are about achieving complex political aims, like democracy, respect for human rights and international law, through the application of both military and civilian means. As such, the operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are essentially tasks of social engineering within the field of international politics. This means that the operational planning will take the form of a predictive, or even a grand theory, of social science. Through the application of variables x and y, the outcome will be z. However, despite a long tradition of positivist, predictive theory within the academic fields of political science and international relations, the empirical tests of such theory have often proved disappointing. Even the greatest historical changes in recent times, like the end of the Cold War and the democratisation of Eastern Europe, have been missed by predictive theory. The reason is simple. Human relations and politics are incredibly complex and include too many variables to create predictive theory. Even with the empirical facts of history on the table, social scientists cannot agree upon explanations for past events, which results in the multitude of theories within the social sciences.

Does this mean that expeditionary operations involving nation building or reconstruction is a futile attempt to shake life into the grand theories of social science? Yes and No! Without proper respect for the difficulty in engineering complex outcomes like democracy and respect for human rights, these operations may well turn out to be rather dangerous endeavours. However, with enough respect for the complexities involved, there may be a way to operate with the greater understanding that is clearly needed within international responses to complex emergencies.

It will always be extremely difficult to plan campaigns and actions by military and civilian agencies that will create specific social outcomes or effects. Not only is it very hard to create the intended effects, but the possible unintentional and cascading effects also have to be included in the equation. With stability and democracy as the end state of the post-conflict operation, what types of operations should be involved and who should perform them? The complexity seems staggering.

The effects sought after in Iraq are complex and highly political, and the activities required to achieve them were, and still are, equally complex. A problem that is often discussed in relation to this is the risk of information overload and the need for effective databases that can handle large amounts of information without drowning the most important pieces. The concept of Effects-Based Operations is closely connected to modern developments within command and control technology and especially the idea of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) or Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC).

However, the technological challenges of expeditionary operations are relatively minor compared to the challenge of understanding effects at a human and political level. It is also of great importance to understand that the human and political challenges of the effects-based approach can never be solved by technical means. The effects of body searching female Muslims, or of organising a barbecue for the local leadership during Ramadan, are not something that will come out of technological advances and improved networks and databases, but out of human understanding. This type of understanding requires experts in local politics, history and culture, that can provide estimates on reactions at the strategic centre of gravity - the hearts and minds of the local population.

(c) Robert Egnell